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FROM THE SIDELINES TO THE COUCH:
A LOOK INTO THE IMPACT PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAM
RELOCATIONS HAVE ON SEASON TICKET HOLDERS
AND PSL OWNERS
“The goal wasn’t to stick it to fans.  The goal was to keep politicians and
sports team owners from sticking it to fans.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: MEET GOLIATH; OVERVIEW OF NFL ECONOMICS
The National Football League (NFL) is considered a trade as-
sociation, which is financed by its participating thirty-two teams.2
To the advantage of all involved, television deals and fan attend-
ance generate NFL revenue of over $7 billion per year.3  If the NFL
were a country, it would be one of the richest countries in the
world.4  If the NFL were a private company, it would likely rank in
America’s top fifty.5  Total revenue is split amongst each of the NFL
franchises.6
1. Jemele Hill, Personal Seat Licenses; Rising Ticket Prices Spell Doom, ESPN (Aug.
4, 2008, 3:49 PM), http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=hill/
080801&sportCat=nfl [https://perma.cc/5LCC-MEQG] (explaining concept of
personal seat licenses (“PSLs”)).
2. See Duff Wilson, N.F.L. Executives Hope to Keep Salaries Secret, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/sports/football/
12nfltax.html [https://perma.cc/U6JE-E7SG] (explaining NFL’s argument that it
is trade association and not charity).
3. See James Brady, The NFL Brought in Enough to Pay for 10 Pluto Missions,
SBNATION (July 20, 2015), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/7/20/9006401/
nfl-teams-revenue-tv-deal-7-billion [https://perma.cc/GF3T-NKQT] (discussing
relevant impact of television deals on NFL).  In 2011, the NFL extended its broad-
cast television packages by nine years with Fox, NBC, and CBS through the 2022
season. See also Kurt Badenhausen, The NFL Signs TV Deals Worth $27 Billion,
FORBES (Dec. 14, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2011/
12/14/the-nfl-signs-tv-deals-worth-26-billion/#6c33f22822b4 [https://perma.cc/
S2Q8-YLNF].  These three networks, individually, pay approximately $3 billion a
year for the right to broadcast NFL games. Id.  Each network is awarded three
Super Bowls throughout the nine-year contract. Id.  The NFL also has deals with
NFL Network and DirectTV, each for $1 billion. Id.
4. See Brady, supra note 3 (“[m]ore comparisons to help put $7.24 billion in
context: [m]ore than every Steven Spielberg movie ever at the box office”).
5. See id. (describing how massive NFL’s revenues are); see also America’s Largest
Private Companies, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/largest-private-
companies/list/#tab:rank [https://perma.cc/NCV5-WAXE] (ranking and listing
data for America’s largest companies).
6. See Brady, supra note 3 (making comparisons and putting in perspective
amount of money NFL earns in revenue).
(81)
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According to FORBES, NFL teams make more than $200 million
annually before kickoff each season.7  Thanks to the league’s current
labor agreement and media deals, “NFL teams are worth $1.04 bil-
lion on average or twice as much as the average MLB team and
three times what NBA teams command.”8  Last year’s Super Bowl
aired in 70% of households across America, reached an estimated
172-million-person audience, and ranked as the fifth most-watched
television program in history.9  In other words, it pays to be a mem-
ber of the league.10
One of the economic factors that allows the NFL to bring in
such a large amount of revenue is the location of its teams.11  Due
to the “national nature of the product, live games being played
throughout the country,” geographic diversity is very important.12
Ideally, it would be most profitable to have franchises mapped out
throughout the country corresponding to where population bases
are the largest.13
For example, it is not ideal that Los Angeles (hereinafter
“L.A.”) football fans will be forced to choose between rooting for
either the Rams or the Chargers, their two hometown teams.14  Lo-
cal individuals and communities that choose to support one organi-
zation will do so at the expense of showing a lack of support for the
other.15  In the words of one sports consultant, “L.A. isn’t a risky
7. See Badenhausen, supra note 3 (“That is more than $200 million per team
every year before one ticket, beer or jersey is sold.”).
8. Id.; see also Kurt Badenhausen, The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Sept.
7, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2011/09/07/the-nfls-
most-valuable-teams/#3a8f54af3bdf [https://perma.cc/H5QG-5SBG] (discussing
worth of NFL teams in 2011).
9. See A.J. Perez, Super Bowl LI Viewership Ranks Among Top Five, USA TODAY
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/02/06/super-
bowl-li-falcons-patriots-tv-rating-fox/97546162/ [https://perma.cc/EL9D-D4E6]
(“The New England Patriots’ historic comeback victory over the Atlanta Falcons—
with a major assist from Lady Gaga at halftime—delivered Fox one of the top-five
most-watched Super Bowls with a viewership of 11.3 million.”).
10. See supra notes 3–9 (recognizing multi-billion-dollar industry’s earning
capacity).
11. See infra notes 12–21 and accompanying text (discussing economic moti-
vations of location of NFL teams).
12. See Franklin M. Fisher et al., The Economics of Sports Leagues and the Reloca-
tion of Teams: The Case of the St. Louis Rams, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 193, 206–07
(2000) (articulating NFL’s interest in location of its teams).
13. See id. at 207 (“If all of the teams were to move to the Northeast, for exam-
ple, fans outside the region would eventually lose interest.”).
14. See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text (questioning L.A.’s ability to
support both Rams and Chargers).
15. See Nathan Fenno, Can L.A. Support Two Teams? It’s a Challenge, L.A. TIMES
(July 10, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-la-two-nfl-teams-
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market . . . . But it becomes a risky market when you add a second
team.”16  The Rams and Chargers will need to fight for a piece of
the pie that is revenue.17  Both organizations will have to share the
professional football market, while also competing for attention
with “professional baseball, basketball, hockey and soccer teams—
in addition to USC and UCLA . . . .”18
In addition to geographic diversity, franchise stability and fan
loyalty add a great deal of value to the NFL.19  Over the years, NFL
teams and the cities in which they are based take on and share cer-
tain identities.20  With time, rivalries between teams (and fans) de-
velop, which is similarly important to franchise stability and benefit
the league as a whole.21
It is for these reasons that the NFL as a trade association, the
league’s thirty-two teams, and the cities, states, and local businesses
that support them benefit from stable, long-term franchises.22
However, when a single franchise’s fan support decreases to an ex-
tent that economically frustrates its revenue, the owner’s interests
begin to no longer align with the rest of the league.23  Owners of
NFL franchises desire relocation when, put simply, “citizens of one
city will pay more for that franchise than the citizens in the incum-
bent city.”24
20170114-story.html [https://perma.cc/KZ6F-ZBJB] (“The issue is attention, not
population or money.”).
16. Id. (quoting Victor Matheson, sports economist at College of Holy Cross).
17. See id. (“Frankly, I have meaningful doubts about L.A. supporting two
teams with sellouts unless both become very successful on the field.”).
18. Id. (recognizing plethora of sports teams, both professional and scholas-
tic, that compete for fans in L.A. area).
19. See Fisher et al., supra note 12, at 206–07 (“In generating and maintaining
fan interest, the NFL also is necessarily committed to franchise stability and the fan
loyalty that franchise stability encourages and rewards.”).
20. See id. at 207–08 (taking note of fact that, for example, Pittsburgh Steelers’
team name is based off its steel industry, San Francisco 49ers’ team name is based
off 1849 gold rush, New England Patriots’ team name is based off patriotism, and
Green Bay Packers’ team name is based off its meat packing industry).
21. See id. at 208 (understanding how rivalries benefit entire league and de-
stroying rivalries hurts league).
22. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text (describing how NFL’s na-
tional product leads to revenue for league members).
23. See Fisher et al., supra note 12, at 208 (explaining externalities and free-
riding in team relocation).
24. Id. at 210 (“[A] team considering relocating from City A to City B will be
interested in the relative extent of fan interest in the two cities, the related ques-
tion of the relative support it can expect from public authorities and private busi-
nesses, and, of course, in the relative terms on which it can acquire of lease
stadium facilities.”).
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However, the NFL and its owners should more fully consider
the effect relocations have on the fans who have long supported
their franchises in tandem with the relevant economics of its billion-
dollar product.25  If owners choose to think of their teams’ fans
only as consumers, and attempt to grow fan support synonymously
with growing an ordinary business, there will be a serious lack of
loyalty in the future if the franchise looks to relocate once again.26
In an era full of technology that allows fans to choose which team to
watch and support each week—through television packages, in-
ternet, and smartphone applications—loyalty is exceptionally rele-
vant to continued market success.27  Franchises that have succeeded
in cultivating such undying loyalty are the ones that have sustained
the largest amount of revenue for their teams and cities over the
years.28
Part II of this Article offers background into the economic mo-
tives, from both the perspective of the NFL and its owners, which
foster team relocation.29  Specifically, Part II(A) discusses the signif-
icance of aging and decrepit stadiums as well as the types of financ-
ing, or lack thereof, which contribute to team relocations and gave
rise to the idea of Personal Seat Licenses (“PSLs”).30  Part II(B) fo-
cuses on defining PSLs and offers several viewpoints regarding
whether their institution is an effective, fair way for team owners to
raise necessary capital.31  Subsequently, Part II(C) examines two dif-
ferent approaches courts have taken when forced to define the le-
25. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
fan loyalty).
26. See Which Team Should Los Angeles NFL Fans Root For?, USA TODAY (Jan. 12,
2017), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/01/chargers-rams-los-angeles-fans [https://
perma.cc/5G64-MPQ5] (“Loyalty won’t mean much when another city beckons in
10 years, and this whole dance is repeated.”).
27. See id. (noting that today geography has less to do with for whom teams’
fans choose to root). See also infra notes 39–82 and accompanying text (recogniz-
ing that often times teams forced to locate do so multiple times due to continued
hardships).
28. See Brett Schrotenboer, Winners and Losers of All the NFL Relocation, USA
TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2017/03/
28/las-vegas-raiders-relocation-los-angeles-rams-chargers/99721134/ [https://
perma.cc/LH2K-45AJ] (“In the long run, it’s also not good for any business to turn
its back on customers who supported it for decades.”).
29. See infra notes 34–90 and accompanying text (reasoning, throughout his-
tory of NFL, why owners have chosen to relocate their franchises).
30. See infra notes 34–90 and accompanying text (explaining how stadiums
force owners to relocate).
31. See infra notes 98–118 and accompanying text (defining and sharing mul-
tiple views on right to renew season ticket packages).
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gal interests associated with these licenses.32  Throughout Part III,
this Article reasons that in an era where it is commonplace for pro-
fessional sports teams to relocate—and fans have both financial and
passionate interests in their teams—courts should favor the ap-
proach that recognizes a legitimate legal expectancy interest in season
ticket packages and award damages in an attempt to deter such
relocations.33  Finally, Part IV summarizes these arguments and fur-
ther advocates for judicial protection of PSL owners in the future.34
II. BACKGROUND
A. Past Wins and Losses . . . and the NFL’s Interference
Recall the NFL’s precompetitive economic interest in having
its teams spread out evenly across the country.35  As with all profes-
sional sports leagues (or any league, for that matter), profits are
maximized when each franchise has its own regional market full of
its own avid fan base that inevitably contributes money, in one way
or another, by supporting its team.36  By way of illustration, “[i]f all
of the teams were to move to the Northeast . . . fans outside that
region would eventually lose interest.”37  Tremendously, under that
scenario, the league’s billion-dollar television contracts and other
shared streams of revenue would decrease significantly.38
Conflict arises when one team—maybe after many consecutive
losing seasons—is not making as much money as its league counter-
parts.39  This leaves frustrated owners unsatisfied, which may lead to
a decision to try and bring their team to a different, oftentimes
32. See infra notes 119–183 and accompanying text (comparing and contrast-
ing idea of recognizing contractual or expectancy interests in right to renew sea-
son tickets).
33. See infra notes 184–276 and accompanying text (surveying decisions set
forth from jurisdictions across country and diving deep into legal policy considera-
tions inherent with courts finding expectancy interests in season tickets and PSLs).
34. See infra notes 277–286 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
geographic diversity on national product as whole); infra notes 36–38 and accom-
panying text.
36. See Fisher et al., supra note 12, at 206–07 (explaining macroeconomics of
how NFL profits).
37. See id. at 207 (providing example of why profits are maximized when
teams have their own market).
38. See id. (“If NFL franchises were concentrated only in particular regions of
the country, national networks would be far less interested in telecasting NFL
games.”).
39. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (reasoning when and why team
owners desire relocation).
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larger, city market.40  However, for the reasons described above,
team relocations greatly frustrate the rest of the league and the city
from which the team departs.41
A prime illustration of this type of economic conflict arose in
1978 when the NFL tried to prevent the Oakland Raiders from relo-
cating to L.A.42  Importantly, Rule 4.3 of the NFL constitution re-
quired three-quarters of the league’s teams to agree to an
individual member’s relocation.43  When this rule was initially chal-
lenged in federal court, the “NFL argue[d] that territorial alloca-
tions are inherent in an agreement between joint ventures to
produce a product.”44  The league contended that certain
“[t]erritories foster fan loyalty which in turn promotes traditional
rivalries between teams, each contributing to attendance at games
and television viewing” throughout the country.45
Disagreeing with the NFL, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed the
rule did not protect the twenty-eight teams’ owners who made up
the trade association at the time.46  The voting requirement did not
discuss any standard, duration limit, or other factors besides fan loy-
alty and team rivalries.47  Therefore, the court concluded that the
NFL failed to meet its burden of proving that the Raiders’ reloca-
tion to L.A. would harm the league in any significant way.48  Follow-
40. See Fisher et al., supra note 12, at 206–07 (“When a team considers moving
from A to B, it will not fully take into account the effect such a move has on the
geographic diversity of the League.”).
41. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text (describing impact of relo-
cations on fans, rivalries, cities, businesses, and most importantly, television deals).
42. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also L.A. Mem’l Coliseum
Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding (1) NFL
was not “single entity” for purposes of anti trust law; (2) evidence supported jury’s
determination that rule requiring three-fourth of members of teams to approve
team move to new city was unreasonable restraint of trade).
43. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1395 (discussing history and
purpose of Rule 4.3 of Article IV of NFL constitution); NFL CONST. & BYLAWS art.
IV, § 4.3 (1978).
44. See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1390 (emphasis in original)
(stating “NFL’s argument that Rule 4.3 is valid as a restraint ancillary to joint ven-
ture agreement”).
45. Id. at 1396; see also supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text (describing
economics of NFL’s national product).
46. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (outlawing formation of “conspir-
acy[ ] in restraint of trade or commerce”). See infra notes 47–49 and accompany-
ing text and related materials (summarizing Ninth Circuit’s decision).
47. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 F.2d at 1396 (recognizing rule protects
owners’ interests in their team but does not make sure concern is satisfied).
48. See id. at 1397 (“Los Angeles is a market large enough for the successful
operation of two teams, there would be no scheduling difficulties, facilities at the
L.A Coliseum are more than adequate, and no loss of future television revenue was
foreseen.  Also, the NFL offered no evidence that its interest in maintaining re-
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ing this decision, NFL commissioner, Pete Rozelle, established a list
of factors “that owners should consider in deciding how to vote on
a move.”49  Interestingly, no new rules addressed the imposition or
computation of the NFL’s relocation fee.50
Following the lawsuit, Al Davis relocated his Raiders from Oak-
land to L.A. in 1982.51  However, after obtaining a “sweetheart sta-
dium deal” to play in the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum
(“OACC”), his franchise returned to Oakland in 1995.52  One
sports writer bluntly explained the economic impact on the rest of
the league:
Just like that, the NFL found itself without representation
in the second-largest U.S. media market, the entertain-
ment capital of the world.  It seemed Davis, whose success-
ful antitrust suit against the NFL cleared the way for him
to move to Los Angeles and cost the league $50 million in
the early 1980s, had once again left the NFL with a black
eye.53
A significant part of Davis’ decision was due to stadium financ-
ing, a factor that continues to be at the forefront of professional
sports team relocations, and will be discussed in detail in Parts II(B)
and III.54  In short, however, the 1994 Northridge earthquake dam-
aged the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (“L.A. Coliseum”) and
the OACC provided Davis a $31.9 million relocation loan, $10 mil-
gional balance would be adversely affected by a move of a northern California
Team to southern California.”).
49. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 154
F.3d 851, 855 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (deciding proper factors to be considered in-
clude adequacy of team’s current stadium, extent of demonstrated fan support,
and extent owner has contributed to need for relocation).
50. See id. (“No guidelines have been promulgated on the imposition or com-
putation of a relocation fee.”).
51. See Alex Marvez, The Long Goodbye: 11 Most Painful NFL Relocations, FOX
SPORTS (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/gallery/san-diego-chargers
-st-louis-rams-oakland-raiders-los-angeles-nfl-teams-different-cities-122115 [https://
perma.cc/J2H2-X6ZH] (discussing history of Rams).
52. Id. (“Davis then returned to the Bay Area after being given a sweetheart
stadium deal by Alameda County officials.”).
53. See Austin Murphy & Michael Silver, Just Move, Baby Al Davis Leaves L.A. to
Return His Raiders to Oakland and, He Hopes, to Glory, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 3,
1995), https://www.si.com/vault/1995/07/03/204434/just-move-baby-al-davis-
left-la-to-return-his-raiders-to-oakland-and-he-hopes-to-glory [https://perma.cc/
2G4X-3W2A] (noting financial support and structural upgrade Davis received by
returning to Oakland).  Concededly, some members of the NFL family did indeed
think the move back to Oakland was good for the NFL overall. Id.
54. See id. (discussing stadium financing); see also infra notes 98–118 &
184–276 (discussing at length season ticket contracts and personal seat licenses).
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lion for a training facility, and $85 million to renovate the stadium
to return to Oakland.55  After renovations, the OACC increased its
number of luxury boxes to 175 (from which the Raiders retained
100% of the boxes’ revenue); contrastingly, there were zero luxury
boxes at the L.A. Coliseum.56
Notwithstanding the excitement in the mid-1990s, Mark Davis,
Al Davis’ son, finalized plans on March 27, 2017, to bring NFL foot-
ball to Las Vegas for the first time.57  NFL owners approved the
Raiders’ eventual move from Oakland to the strip per a 31-1 vote.58
Las Vegas provided public funds totaling $750 million while Bank
of America provided Mark Davis with a $650 million loan.59  The
move marks the third NFL relocation current team owners ap-
proved over the course of a little over a year; however, unlike the
Rams and Chargers, the Raiders will remain in Oakland until their
new Las Vegas home is constructed.60  It will be interesting to ob-
serve the dynamic between the team and the City of Oakland dur-
ing the interim.61
If the past is any indication, however, relocations have shown
to be quite painful for the city from which the team departed.62
For similar reasons that forced the Raiders to relocate multiple
times—an inability to secure sufficient stadium funding—in 1996,
Cleveland Browns owner, Art Modell, took his team to Baltimore.63
55. See Murphy & Silver, supra note 53 (reasoning why Raiders moved back
across town).
56. See id. (financing came from bond issues and from fans paying to $4,000
apiece for ten-year “seat licenses”).
57. See Rich Campbell, NFL Owners Approve Raiders’ Move from Oakland to Las
Vegas, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
sports/football/ct-raiders-move-to-las-vegas-approved-20170327-story.html [https:/
/perma.cc/L9JR-XBHD] (recognizing recent decisions of Rams, Chargers, and
Raiders to relocate in past year or so).
58. See id. (“[O]wners approved the move Monday, as expected, by a vote of
31-1 with only the Dolphins dissenting.”).
59. See id. (reporting deal).  In finalizing its deal to move to Las Vegas, the
Raiders rejected a $1.3 billion deal from the City of Oakland. See Mike Florio,
Oakland Touts Last-Ditch Effort as Better than Vegas Offer, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 24, 2017,
7:24 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2017/03/24/oakland-touts-last-
ditch-effort-as-better-than-vegas-offer/ [https://perma.cc/2T9K-YAHR] (reporting
offer made by city of Oakland to keep Raider in Oakland).
60. See Campbell, supra note 57 (“But the team won’t be moving for the 2017
season and maybe not for two years after that, creating a potentially awkward and
negative dynamic between the team and many fans.”).
61. See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (discussing impact of reloca-
tions on fans that share identity with their cities’ teams).
62. See infra notes 63–77 and accompanying text (discussing Browns’ reloca-
tion from Cleveland to Baltimore).
63. See Marvez, supra note 51 (reflecting on NFL relocations throughout
century).
8
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss1/3
2018] FROM THE SIDELINES TO THE COUCH 89
The franchise succeeded under its new guise as the Baltimore Ra-
vens; however, negotiations with the league forced Modell to allow
new ownership in Cleveland to keep the Browns’ name, and the
economics involved (or lack thereof) are still contributing to the
franchise’s ongoing failure.64  Since the team was revamped in
1999, the franchise has had only two winning seasons and has yet to
win a playoff game.65  Any fan that enjoys playing “fantasy football”
would be quick to crack a joke about the franchise’s quarterback
situation over the last decade.66
The Browns’ relocation in 1996 illuminates the effects team
relocations have on rivalries.67  Until Modell chose to relocate in
1996, the Steelers and Browns epitomized the type of revenue-pro-
ducing rivalry that benefited the sport.68  Close in proximity, each
franchise’s passionate working-class fan base took on their respec-
tive city’s identity.69  Nowadays, while the rivalry between the Balti-
more Ravens and Pittsburgh Steelers is flourishing, Cleveland’s
“Dawg Pound” watches its Browns get “banged up” every Football
Sunday.70
Other examples of relocations brought on by economically-
frustrated times include the now-Arizona Cardinals, despite the fact
64. See id. (explaining how “new” Cleveland Browns are one of least successful
professional sports teams and have not won playoff game since team was revamped
by new ownership in 1999).
65. See Mike Wilkening, Twenty Years Ago Thursday, the Browns Last Won a Play-
off Game, NBC SPORTS (Jan. 1, 2015, 10:08 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbc
sports.com/2015/01/01/twenty-years-ago-thursday-the-browns-last-won-a-playoff-
game/ [https://perma.cc/N7PG-W46L] (recognizing shameful postseason
record).
66. See Sam Gardner, The Astonishingly Awful Record of Cleveland Browns
Quarterbacks, FOX SPORTS (Nov. 11, 2016, 2:33 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/
nfl/gallery/cleveland-browns-quarterbacks-history-johnny-manziel-cody-kessler-
josh-mccown-111116 [https://perma.cc/6H9C-3R3K] (documenting records of
Brian Hoyer, Jake Delhomme, Derek Anderson, Tim Couch, Trent Dilfer, Kelly
Holcomb, Charlie Frye, Jeff Garcia, Colt McCoy, Brandon Weeden, Brady Quinn,
and Johnny Manziel).
67. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (reasoning why Browns lost
their longstanding rivalry with Steelers to Ravens).
68. See James Hritz, How Did the Rivalry Start Between the Pittsburgh Steelers and
the Baltimore Ravens?, QUORA (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.quora.com/How-did-
the-rivalry-start-between-the-Pittsburgh-Steelers-and-the-Baltimore-Ravens [https:/
/perma.cc/U7CQ-RH2B] (noting when rivalry was most prestigious); see also supra
note 21 and accompanying text (discussing how rivalries are important to
franchise stability).
69. See Hritz, supra note 68 (noting fans took on their cities’ identities).
70. See Jenny Vrentas, ‘Pure Hatred’: An Oral History of the Steelers-Ravens Rivalry,
MMQB (Dec. 22, 2016), http://mmqb.si.com/mmqb/2016/12/21/steelers-ravens
-rivalry-oral-history# [https://perma.cc/AN4Y-7TQL] (allowing athletes to share
thoughts on rivalry).
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they are the oldest continuously-run professional football team in
the nation.71  Likewise, the Chargers debuted in L.A. in 1960 (for
one season) before team owner, Barron Hilton, realized his team
was unable to share a market with the Rams and moved his team to
San Diego.72  Half a century later, owner Dean Spanos decided to
take the opposite approach and move the Chargers back to L.A.73
In 1963, the Kansas City Chiefs (then-Texans) were forced out of
Texas due to the Cowboys’ success.74  After the Great Depression,
the Lions moved from a small town in Ohio to industrialized De-
troit.75  Some may have forgotten that the Washington Redskins
had a five-year run in Boston before returning to the country’s capi-
tal due to financial failure.76  Additionally, the Colts’ decision to
move from Baltimore to Indianapolis is yet another example of an
owner choosing relocation after “declining attendance and ongo-
ing squabbles with city leaders.”77
This brings us to the L.A. Rams.78  Amongst the oldest
franchises in the NFL, the team’s history began in Cleveland in
1937.79  By the 1940s, Dan Reeves, “a shrewd businessman and a
master innovator,” purchased the team and moved the franchise
across the country to L.A. several years later.80  Throughout the
71. See History, ARIZ. CARDINALS, http://www.azcardinals.com/history/fran
chise.html [https://perma.cc/KQ2M-4NRD] (last visited Aug. 21, 2017) (detailing
modern era of relocations including from Chicago to St. Louis and from St. Louis
to Arizona).
72. See Brent Schrotenboer, What We Know About Chargers’ Move to Los Angeles,
USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
nfl/chargers/2017/01/12/chargers-los-angeles-move-san-diego-relocation/965058
36/ [https://perma.cc/XM3M-2LD4] (noting successive owners came to opposite
conclusions about team’s ability to share market with Rams).
73. See id. (quoting Stanos, who stated that “Chargers are determined to fight
for L.A. and we are excited to get started”).
74. See Marvez, supra note 51 (“The Cowboys eventually gained the upper
hand in popularity despite the Texans winning the AFL title in 1962, which
prompted team owner Lamar Hunt to seek another home.”).
75. See id. (“Detroit Radio magnate G.A. Richards bought the Spartans and
rebranded the club as the Lions to play off the popularity of the Detroit Tigers
baseball team.”).
76. See id. (discussing decision by Redskins’ owner, George Preston Marshall,
to return to where franchise began).
77. See id. (illustrating why Colts’ owner, Bob Irsay, began looking to relocate
his team).
78. See infra notes 79–84 and accompanying text and related materials (dis-
cussing multiple relocations of Rams).
79. See Los Angeles Rams Team History, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME,  http://
www.profootballhof.com/teams/los-angeles-rams/team-history/ [https://
perma.cc/EM8J-SGP9] (last visited Jan. 22, 2017) (documenting history of L.A.
Rams).
80. Id. (rehashing team’s early years); see also supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
10
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1970s, the team experienced success under the direction of an ef-
fective head coach and seminal Hall-of-Famers.81  However, a lack
of attendance forced the team to downsize into a smaller stadium in
1980.82  An opportunity then became available for the Rams in St.
Louis when the Cardinals left for Arizona in 1998.83
When the Cardinals left St. Louis for Arizona in the mid-1990s
after the city refused to build a new football stadium, a devastated
St. Louis conducted a referendum to decide whether the city
should construct the St. Louis Convention and Visitors Center
(“CVC”) to try to attract a potential NFL expansion team.84  After
the city was unable to attract an expansion team, a civic organiza-
tion, Football at the New Stadium (“FANS”), assisted the CVC in
luring in the Rams.85  After the CVC and Rams reached a deal, the
Rams notified the NFL.86  However, the team owners vetoed the
initial proposal.87  Other owners took issue with the facts that: (1)
the deal did not include a relocation fee, (2) that revenues from
the sale of the Rams’ future PSLs would be shared, and (3) the
proposal would not resolve issues pertaining to television pay-
ments.88  After further negotiations, an agreement was reached
whereby “[t]he Rams [ ] agreed to pay a $29 million relocation fee,
81. See PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, supra note 79 (documenting era of
George Allen, Merlin Olsen, and Deacon Jones).
82. See infra note 84 and accompanying text (describing reasons for St. Louis
Rams’ relocation).
83. See Marvez, supra note 51 (describing reasons for St. Louis Rams’
relocation).
84. See Fisher et al., supra note 12, at 198 (stating why Cardinals relocated); see
also St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 154 F.3d
851, 852 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating efforts taken to relocate NFL team back to St.
Louis).
85. See Fisher et al., supra note 12, at 198 (stating why Cardinals relocated); see
also St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 852–53 (“The new franchises were awarded to
Jacksonville, Florida, and Charlotte, North Carolina.”).  When St. Louis applied for
an expansion team, two businessmen controlled the exclusive rights to the Trans
World Dome. See id. at 854. Those that had a vote on whether St. Louis would
receive an expansion team worried that those who controlled the lease were unre-
lated to the CVC. Id.
86. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing how deal was reached
before NFL was notified).
87. See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (acting as precursor to NFL’s non-exclusive factors when con-
sidering team’s relocation).  Relevantly, there are no guidelines for computing re-
location fees. Id.; see also St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 854–55 (“While not
expressed in the governing documents, the league claims the right to assess a relo-
cation fee on any team seeking to move.”).
88. See St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 855 (stating reasons Rams’ initial pro-
posal was voted down).  Importantly, up until this time, landlords were not in-
volved in the NFL’s relocation process. Id.  See generally infra notes 98–104 and
accompanying text (defining PSLs and explaining conceptual framework).
11
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to forego any share in the next two relocation fees levied by the
league, to share $17 million in [PSL] revenue with the NFL, and to
indemnify the league for up to $12.5 million of any extra expenses
arising from the league’s television contract.”89  The Rams officially
relocated to St. Louis as of April 12, 1995.90
Due to the fact that the CVC ended up contractually obligated
to pay $20 million of the relocation fee—and other issues that en-
sued from the lengthy negotiation process—it filed suit against the
NFL and twenty-four of its teams in 1995.91  The CVC alleged the
NFL violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and
interfered with its already-established contract with the Rams.92  Be-
cause the CVC and the Rams already had a contract, the CVC
claimed Rule 4.3 “forced their hand” and obligated it to give into
contractual demands it otherwise could have avoided.93  However,
the Eighth Circuit disagreed.94  The Eighth Circuit held that the
CVC failed to prove the essential elements required under Section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act or for tortious interference as re-
quired per Missouri law.95  The CVC’s lack of success reaffirmed the
89. St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 855.
90. See id. (“While not expressed in the governing documents, the League
claims the right to assess a relocation fee on any time seeking to move.  At the time
CVC was dealing with the Rams, the NFL had levied one previous relocation fee;
the Cardinals had been assessed $7.5 million for their move to Phoenix.”); see also
NFL CONST. & BYLAWS art. IV, § 4.3 (1984).
91. See St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 852 (providing background for suit);
see also infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing CVC’s damages and
claims).
92. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (preventing, through federal law, large businesses
from monopolizing markets); see also St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 852 (provid-
ing background for suit).  A jury awarded judgment in favor of the NFL. Id.  CVC
appealed against the trial court’s dismissal of its claims that the NFL violated the
Sherman Act and tortiously interfered with its contract. Id. at 853.  The NFL also
cross-appealed and challenged the trial court’s finding that “the league and the
member teams do not amount to a single entity for antitrust purposes.” Id.
93. St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 854 (agreeing Rams would pay CVC
$25,000 per game in addition to half of game day expenses for ability to keep all
ticket revenue, 75% of first $6 million advertising revenue and 90% after that,
100% of profits from concessions and amount of concessions from other events);
see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing Rule 4.3).  For tortious
contract interference, the CVC sought damages in the amount of the relocation
fee arguing it only accepted contractual term because of economic duress. Id. at
856.
94. See St. Louis Convention, 154 F.3d at 865 (entering judgment in favor of
NFL).
95. See id. at 865 (citing Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. 1996))
(affirming district court’s ruling).  To prove tortious interference under Missouri
law, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a contract or valid business expectancy; (2) defen-
dant’s knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) a breach induced or caused
by defendant’s intentional interference; (4) the absence of justification; and (5)
damages.” Id. (quoting Rice, 919 S.W.2d at 245).
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power of the NFL and its freedom to conduct its affairs pursuant
only to its constitution and bylaws.96  This case is also a good illus-
tration of the difficulties small-market teams face, especially those
who are no strangers to relocation.97
B. Enter the Money-Hungry Era of Personal Seat Licenses
One of the disputed terms of the Rams’ initial relocation
agreement regarded a share of revenues attributed to PSLs, a rela-
tively new phenomenon at the time.98  In response to the struggle
many franchises had in securing stadium financing, PSLs were
thought of as a way to privately raise capital (to attract professional
sports teams) in city markets that otherwise would not be able to
afford to renovate or construct new stadiums.99  They began simply
as “one-time fees for the right to buy season tickets.”100  In other
words, they were viewed “akin to initiation fees” for season ticket
holders because “[t]hey are owned by fans, not the team, provided
that the seats are renewed each season.”101  The founder of PSLs
postulated that PSL sales would make license-owners feel like they
are a part of the team.102  To many, it made sense that individuals
who actually attended professional sporting events would pay an in-
96. See id. (stating CVC was unable to point to authority in support of its
argument).
97. For a discussion of how small market teams, such as the Raiders, Browns,
Cardinals, Chargers, Chiefs, Lions, Redskins, and Colts, had to relocate due to an
inability to compete, difficulty producing revenue, failing to secure stadium financ-
ing, or a combination of the three, see supra notes 42–77 and accompanying text.
In the modern era—which requires three-fourths of team owners to approve a
team relocation—regardless of the type of struggles individual small market teams
face, the NFL will always have final say on whether one of its members is able to
relocate and will do its best to keep teams in cities that bring the most profit to the
trade association as a whole. See NFL CONST. & BYLAWS, art. IV, § 3, available at
http://www.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35WR-NC6A]; see also supra notes 11–13 and related material
(explaining why it is most profitable to NFL to have teams spread out across coun-
try in cities where populations are largest).
98. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (discussing what angered
NFL owners about Rams’ relocation agreement).
99. See generally Hill, supra note 1 (explaining concept of PSLs).
100. Aaron Gordon, The Creator of Personal Seat Licenses Hates Them as Much as
You Do, VICE SPORTS (Dec. 28, 2015, 9:48 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/arti
cle/the-creator-of-personal-seat-licenses-hates-them-as-much-as-you-do [https://
perma.cc/DLW9-CS5F] (recognizing that purpose behind PSLs no longer works as
intended).
101. See Jeff Barker, Owning a Ravens Seat Can Pay off Big Time, BALT. SUN
(June 25, 2009), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-06-25/news/0906240127_
1_ravens-psls-seat-licenses [https://perma.cc/9S82-H5W8] (comparing PSLs to
investments).
102. See Gordon, supra note 100 (“It was simply about thanking the fans who
pledged their own money to help support a new team or stadium.”).
13
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creased amount of money to do so.103  With PSLs, cities bringing in
professional sports teams or renovating already-existing stadiums
would not necessarily have to raise taxes.104  For example, when the
Ravens moved to Baltimore from Cleveland in 1996, PSLs
“recoup[ed] millions of dollars in relocation costs.”105
In 2008, the New York Giants “publically announced that all
season ticket holder subscriptions would be terminated unless the
season ticket holder agreed to enter into a PSL contract for each
seat with Giants Stadium LLC and/or Jets Stadium Development
LLC.”106  The contract gave the PSL holder the right to purchase
season tickets for as long as the Giants play in the new stadium.107
PSLs were sold for any amount between $1,000 and $25,000 per
seat.108
John Mara, the Giants President, was not enthusiastic about in-
stituting PSLs, knowing there would be backlash from life-long fans
and season ticket holders.109  Mara acknowledged the concerns of
these season ticket holders, but after weighing the pros and cons,
explained that “our primary goal was to come up with the right
amount of capital so we could complete the construction” of the
new stadium.110  PSLs may have helped raise capital, but for others,
it means we live in a “sports world that is no longer within reach of
everyday people.”111  In the words of one ESPN anchor, “[t]here is
something wrong with fans’ being charged a fee for the right to buy
season tickets. It’s like charging human beings for the right to chew
before they even taste the food.”112  Put bluntly, “on principle, PSLs
suck.”113
103. See, e.g., Hill supra note 1 (explaining concept of PSLs).
104. See, e.g., id. (explaining concept of PSLs).
105. Barker, supra note 101 and accompanying text (“PSLs, which helped the
Ravens recoup millions of dollars in relocation costs from their 1996 move from
Cleveland, are now yielding windfalls for hundreds of season ticket holders who
bought in early.”).
106. Estate of Oshinsky v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 2011 WL 383880, at *1
(D.N.J. 2011).
107. See id. at *2 (discussing contractual rights of season ticket holder).
108. See id. at *1 (discussing price of singular PSL).
109. See Hill, supra note 1 (“Giants fans have let Mara hear about it, but he
says there wasn’t much he could do.”).
110. Id. (quoting Mara).
111. Id. (explaining Giants decision to ultimately institute PSLs).
112. Id.
113. Id. (making comparisons to how PSLs take advantage of everyday sports
fans).
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Notwithstanding, “NFL teams are [now] building the most ex-
pensive stadiums in history.”114  More than half of the NFL’s teams
are engaged in the practice of instituting PSLs to their respective
season ticket holders.115  This includes the Minnesota Vikings and
Atlanta Falcons, who recently constructed new facilities, costing
$1.061 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively.116  In Atlanta, PSL
prices vary from $500 to $45,000 in proportion to their location.117
Sales were slow in early 2016 but after reaching Super Bowl 50, sales
increased tenfold.118
C. Contractual Interest or Expectancy Interest
Despite winning a Super Bowl in St. Louis, economic hardship
forced the Rams to return to Los Angeles in 2015.119  When the
team relocated, angry PSL owners sued the Rams in a consolidated
114. Aaron Gordon, New PSLs Have Become Very Risky Investments, FORBES
(Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2012/09/05/nfl-psls-
have-become-very-risky-investments/#5aef1e681244 [https://perma.cc/H2D2-
8EHC] (referring to fact that new Giants stadium cost $1.6 billion to construct
while Cowboys AT&T stadium cost $1.2 billion).
115. See Mike Ozanian, Are NFL Personal Seat Licenses Good Investments?, FORBES
(Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2015/11/25/are-nfl-
personal-seat-licenses-good-investments/#4fd6b5f636b1 [https://perma.cc/8V7G-
9PPP] (contemplating PSLs as investment opportunities).
116. See id. (concluding some PSL investments have been good opportunities
for fans while others have turned out poorly); see also Tim Tucker, Mercedez-Benz
Stadium Opening Is Pushed Back Again, AJC (Apr. 18, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://
www.ajc.com/sports/football/mercedes-benz-stadium-opening-pushed-back-
again/wLnfyURmUXYvGcj6iaROMM/ [https://perma.cc/23HS-3ML4] (report-
ing on construction of Falcons’ new $1.5 billion stadium); Wilfs Pledge $19.5M More
to Stadium, ESPN (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/
12566029/wilf-family-pledges-195-million-more-minnesota-vikings-stadium [https:/
/perma.cc/7L5U-WLDN] (noting Wilf family pledged about $52 million while
$498 million was public money).
117. See Darren Rovell, Super Bowl LI Trip Boosting Ticket Sales for Falcons’ New
Stadium, ESPN (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/18566915/
super-bowl-li-trip-boosting-sales-personal-seat-licences-atlanta-falcons-new-stadium
[https://perma.cc/74QR-K63W] (stating PSL sales increased as Falcons advanced
to Super Bowl in 2017).
118. See id. (quoting Steve Cannon, CEO of AMB Group, parent company of
team owned by Arthur Blank) (“We closed down the Georgia Dome in style, and
what our team has done has allowed us to take advantage of opening Mercedes-
Benz Stadium.”).  After advancing to the Super Bowl, the Falcons organization sold
over 75% of its new stadium’s PSL (88% in lower lever, upper level sold out, 90%
of suites). See id.
119. See Joe Nocera, In Losing the Rams, St. Louis Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/sports/football/st-louis-should-be-
glad-it-lost-the-rams.html [https://perma.cc/JE2X-QGX2] (“Let’s not be coy
about this: St. Louis, a city of fewer than 320,000 people, with a shrinking tax base,
simply couldn’t afford to help finance the $1 billion stadium that the Rams’ bil-
lionaire owner, E. Stanley Kroenke, was seeking.”).  These financial concerns have
existed since the Rams first moved from Los Angeles to St. Louis in 1995. See id.
15
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class action.120  In McAllister v. St. Louis Rams,121 the court found a
strict contractual interest in each PSL owner’s disputed right to re-
new season tickets following the move.122  On the contrary, the
court in In re I.D. Craig Service Corp.,123 represents a more judicially
active approach, one that finds a distinct “expectancy interest” in a
season ticket holder’s right to renew their seats each season.124  The
following two subsections compare and contrast these holdings.125
1. Contractual Interest: McAllister v. St. Louis Rams
Recall that in 1995, St. Louis fans were required to purchase
PSLs “that entitled the PSL holder to buy one season ticket per year
in a designated section of the stadium.”126  When the Rams de-
clared they were moving back to L.A., PSL holders sued the Rams
in three class actions that were consolidated into McAllister.127  Two
groups of plaintiffs (the “Envision and Arnold” Plaintiffs) argued
for the right to purchase Rams season tickets in California.128  The
St. Louis Rams, LLC  (“Rams” or “Defendant”) moved for summary
judgment alleging the “PSL Agreements between the team and the
PSL holders are by their terms no longer in effect now that the
team has moved to California.”129  Alternatively, the third group of
plaintiffs (the “McAllister” Plaintiffs) argued for a refund by claim-
ing Defendant terminated the contract, and thus, is in breach.130
i. The Envision and Arnold Plaintiffs
The claims advanced by the Envision and Arnold Plaintiffs re-
volved around two separate PSL agreements.131  When the Rams
120. See generally McAllister v. St. Louis Rams, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1121,
1124–27 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (“Three season ticket holders brought separate actions,
which were consolidated, against professional football team, seeking damages aris-
ing from football team’s move to a new home venue in another state.”).
121. 209 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (E.D. Mo. 2016).
122. See id. at 1129 (looking to agreements for contractual clarity).
123. 138 B.R. 490 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
124. See generally id. (holding Steelers had created an expectancy interest in
season ticket holders’ renewal rights).
125. See infra notes 126–183 and accompanying text (discussing both
approaches).
126. McAllister v. St. Louis Rams, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1123 (E.D. Mo.
2016) (giving background to suit regarding 46,000 PSLs that were sold to fans in
St. Louis).
127. See id. at 1123 (differentiating claims against Rams organization).
128. See id. at 1124 (explaining Envision and Arnold Plaintiffs’ claim).
129. Id. at 1125 (stating Defendant’s argument).
130. See id. at 1127 (explaining McAllister Plaintiffs’ claims).
131. See id. at 1123 (giving background to suit regarding 46,000 PSLs that
were sold to fans in St. Louis).
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss1/3
2018] FROM THE SIDELINES TO THE COUCH 97
first moved from L.A. to St. Louis, FANS, Inc. issued PSLs to fi-
nance the stadium (“FANS Agreement”).132  Later, additional PSL
Agreements were “sold directly by the Rams using an almost identi-
cal contract (‘Rams’ Agreement).”133  The district court found the
dissimilar provisions of utmost importance.134
The FANS Agreement allowed the holder “to purchase Season
Tickets(s) to Licensee’s seats for all games at the Stadium until
March 1, 2025.”135  Second, the FANS Agreement included a “Best
Efforts” provision that stated in part, “[i]f the RAMS play any of
their [NFL] games other than at the Stadium . . . Licensor will use
its best efforts to assure Licensee the right to purchase . . . tickets
for seats in the stadium where the transferred games are played.”136
Third, the “Representations of Licensee” provision forced the Li-
censee to acknowledge that the holder “represents, warrants and/
or acknowledges . . . Licensee is acquiring the [PSL] solely for the
right to purchase Season Ticket(s) to NFL Games played in the Sta-
dium.”137  Fourth, under “Additional Terms,” the FANS Agreement
clearly articulated, “Licensee acknowledges that this Agreement re-
mains valid only as long as NFL football is played at the Stadium by
the RAMS, up to a maximum of thirty (30) years.”138  The provision
went on to state that “Licensee acknowledges that Licensee has no
claim against the RAMS with respect to the [PSL agreement] and/
or its termination whatsoever.  Licensee understands and acknowl-
edges the possibility that the RAMS may not play its games in the
Stadium or St. Louis for the entire term contemplated by this
License.”139
Given these contractual provisions, it is important to begin
scrutinizing this decision with the premise that contract law governs
PSLs, which are really just licensing agreements.140  The court rec-
ognized “the cardinal rule in the interpretation of a contract is to
132. See id. at 1125; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text (relating to
initial financing).
133. See McAllister, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1124 (emphasis added) (introducing
difference between two PSL Agreements at issue).
134. See id. at 1125 (basing contractual interpretations on minor drafting dis-
crepancies); see also infra notes 135–159 and accompanying text.
135. McAllister, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1124 (alteration in original) (quoting FANS
Agreement).
136. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FANS Agreement).
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FANS Agreement).
138. Id. (quoting FANS Agreement).
139. Id. (quoting FANS Agreement).
140. See id. at 1125 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Garst Seed Co., 241 S.W.3d 401,
406 (Mo. App. 2007)) (“The Agreements in question are license agreements,
which are contracts governed by the general principles of contract law.”).
17
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ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that inten-
tion.”141  The Envision and Arnold Plaintiffs interpreted the PSL’s
“Best Efforts” provision as giving them a chance to purchase season
tickets at the Rams future L.A. venue.142  The Rams, as one might
expect, maintained that since the team was no longer playing
games in St. Louis, the contract became null and void.143  Accord-
ing to the Envision and Arnold Plaintiffs, however, it was not that
simple.144  They interpreted “transferred games” as found in the
“Best Efforts” provision to mean games played at “any venue to
which the Rams transfer their home games – including a perma-
nent change of home games, such as relocating to California.”145
As such, the court was obligated to interpret the definition of
“transferred games” as intended by the parties.146  In an effort to
remain practical, the court sided with the Rams and interpreted
“transferred games” to mean home games played at nearby facilities
while the Rams were located in St. Louis.147  Ultimately, this meant
the FANS Agreement was terminated upon the team’s relocation
and the claims advanced by the Envision and Arnold Plaintiffs per-
taining to the FANS Agreement were rendered without merit.148
In contrast, the court determined “[t]he Rams Agreement . . .
is different [from the FANS Agreement] and require[d] further dis-
cussion.”149  Critical to its analysis was the fact that the FANS Agree-
ment’s “Additional Terms” provision was not identical to the
“Additional Terms” provision of the Rams Agreement.150  The
Rams Agreement did not include the following sentences: “Licen-
see acknowledges that this Agreement remains valid only as long as
NFL Football is played at the stadium by the RAMS, up to a maxi-
141. Id. (quoting J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491 S.W.2d
261, 264 (Mo. 1973) (en banc)).
142. See id. (“‘Best Efforts’ provision of the Agreements entitles them to the
opportunity to buy tickets for games—‘transferred games’—to be played at the
new Rams stadium that will be built in California.”).
143. See id. (introducing Defendant’s interpretation of “Additional Terms”
provision).
144. See id. (using “Best Efforts” provision to counter Defendant’s argument).
145. Id. (countering Defendant’s argument).
146. See id. (settling matter as contract dispute).
147. See id. at 1126 (interpreting “Best Efforts” provision as meaning: if games
could not be played at home stadium due to natural disaster and Rams transferred
home games to local university, PSL holder’s would have access to those games).
148. See id. (entering judgment on pleadings to Rams).
149. Id. (noting that FANS Agreement includes language omitted from Rams
Agreement).
150. See id. at 1126–27 (specifying contractual language of each agreement’s
“Additional Terms” provision).
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mum of thirty (30) years. Licensee acknowledges that Licensee has
no claim against the RAMS with respect to the [PSL Agreement]
and/or its termination whatsoever.”151  This meant that “the validity
of the Rams Agreement [was] not contingent on the Rams playing
football” in their stadium in St. Louis.152  Likewise, “the Agreement
remains in effect until 2025, and, regardless of where the Rams play
their home games, they are required to use ‘Best Efforts’ to allow
PSL holders the right to purchase ‘tickets for seats in the stadium
where the transferred games are played.’”153
ii. The McAllister Plaintiffs
Instead of seeking PSLs in L.A., the McAllister Plaintiffs simply
alleged that as PSL owners, they were entitled to a refund because
the Rams did, in fact, terminate the PSL agreements.154  The termi-
nation clauses in both the FANS and Rams Agreements “are sub-
stantively identical” and state in part the “Licensor hereby expressly
reserves . . . [t]he right to terminate this Agreement and refund
part of or all of the Licensee’s deposit [under several circum-
stances].”155  The Rams argued the contract was terminated and
this clause “expired” when the Rams permanently decided to no
longer play in St. Louis.156  The McAllister Plaintiffs argued, and
more importantly the court found, once the contracts expired the
expressed contractual terms entitled the plaintiffs to a refund of
their “deposit.”157
In sum, for Federal Judge Limbaugh of the Eastern District of
Missouri, the case was merely a matter of contract law.158  Interest-
151. Id. at 1126 (quoting FANS Agreement).
152. Id. at 1127 (meaning that under Rams Agreement, Rams are required to
use best efforts to secure PSL holders seats at transferred home games).
153. See id. (internal citation omitted) (denying judgment on pleadings to
Rams).
154. See id. (stating McAllister Plaintiffs’ claims).
155. See id. (quoting termination clauses of Agreements).
156. See id. (“The Rams explain that any duty to refund deposits could not
have survived expiration of the Agreements.”).
157. See id. at 1128 (“By the Agreement’s own terms, the right to terminate
and a refund of deposits go hand-in-hand.”).  Regarding the FANS Agreement, the
court left the determination of what exactly constitutes a deposit—a matter of
damages, not liability— to a later date. Id. at 1129. The court also diligently noted
that although the McAllister Plaintiffs did not seek a remedy under the Rams
Agreement, the remedy would have been the ability to obtain tickets in Los Ange-
les. Id.
158. See Ashley Milano, Fans Win Refund or New Tickets in Rams Relocation Class
Action, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Sept. 23, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-
settlements/lawsuit-news/345254-fans-win-refund-new-tickets-rams-relocation-class-
action/ (summarizing Judge Limbaugh’s holding).
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ingly, despite the fact that both “the FANS and Rams contracts
sa[id] a PSL holder cannot sue for damages over PSLs, the Rams
failed to present that as an argument or even mention it in
court.”159
2. Expectancy Interest: I.D. Craig
Although PSLs have added another dimension, the debate
over who owns the “property interest” associated with season ticket
packages has been going on for decades.160  If season ticket holders
have a property interest in their season tickets, professional sports
teams “would be forced to compensate [those] able to demonstrate
damages.”161  For this reason, as a matter of state law, the distinc-
tion between revocable licenses and property interests becomes
quite important.162
Relevant to this determination are (1) whether the sports or-
ganization operates under an open or closed transfer system and
(2) whether holders have an automatic right to renew their season
tickets.163  Open transfer policies afford season ticket owners the
“convenience of transferring or ‘selling’ their season tickets to
whomever they wish[ ].”164  In contrast, a “closed transfer system
forces an existing season ticket holder who elects not to renew their
account to return ‘the team’s’ ticket to its control.”165  Multiple law-
suits took place throughout the 1990s that support the view that in
a closed transfer system that does not afford the holder an automatic
right to renew, season tickets ought to be considered revocable seat
licenses—as opposed to the fans’ property interests.166
159. Id. (quoting FANS and Rams Agreements).
160. See infra notes 167–224 and accompanying text (discussing prior case law
on season tickets renewal rights).
161. James T. Reese et al., National Football League Ticket Transfer Policies: Legal
and Policy Issues, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 163, 185 (2004) (discussing importance
of property interest in season tickets and PSLs).
162. See id. (recognizing importance of ticket classification).
163. See id.
When tickets are considered revocable seat licenses, sports organizations
have the ability to move season ticket holders to similar locations without
fear of legal consequences.  However, if season ticket locations are classi-
fied as property by the courts, legal action could be taken by any season
ticket holder unhappy with the new seat assignment in a new facility.
Id.
164. Id. at 167 (discussing open transfer system).
165. Id. at 171 (discussing closed transfer system).
166. See id. at 176–78 (citing In re Harrell, 73 F.3d 218 (9th Cir. 1996), Soder-
holm v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 517 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), and
Ganey v. N.Y. Jets Football Club, 550 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990)).
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Nonetheless, an innovative legal argument led to the opposite
result in I.D. Craig.167  In that case, litigated in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, a trustee
of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate sold the debtor’s Pittsburgh Steelers
season tickets.168  Separately, the trustee moved to sell each ticket’s
“renewal rights thereafter.”169  At the onset, the court recognized
two important points.170  First, in Pittsburgh, “[s]eason ticket
holder status historically has included an automatic annual
purchase offer and the right to transfer the status via written re-
quest and payment of a five dollar transfer fee.”171  Second, as a
bankruptcy matter, the court acknowledged that under 11 U.S.C.
§ 541, “all interests of [a] debtor are estate property.”172  As a result,
the trustee reasoned the debtor had a property interest in his right
to renew his Steelers season tickets.173  Conversely, Pittsburgh
Steelers Sports, Inc. (“Sports, Inc.”) objected to the sale of renewal
rights by alleging such a sale would violate Pennsylvania’s anti-scalp-
ing laws and “constitute an executory contract which Trustee failed
to assume within sixty days after the case was converted to chapter
7.”174  Furthermore, Sports, Inc. argued that in order to be fair to
individuals on the season-ticket-holder waiting list, it was good pol-
icy to limit the number of openly transferable season tickets to one
ticket per holder.175
The court determined that even though the debtor’s trustee
conceded that each individual ticket is a revocable license, it is im-
material to deciding whether the defendant can legally refuse to
recognize the debtor’s status or prevent him from transferring his
167. See generally 138 B.R. 490 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding expectancy
interest in irrevocable right to renew season tickets).
168. See id. at 492.
169. Id.
170. See infra notes 171–172 and accompanying text (referencing threshold
concerns).
171. In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. at 492 (referring to “renewal rights”).
The President of the Pittsburgh Steelers attested that as long as season ticket hold-
ers continue to purchase season tickets, “they retain[ ] the status.” Id. at 493.  Not-
withstanding, each ticket states that it is a “revocable license and may be revoked
and admission refused upon refunding the printed price thereon.  This ticket may
not be resold at a premium . . . .” Id.
172. Id. at 492 (emphasis in original) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2016)).
173. See id. (stating plaintiff’s argument).
174. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1988)) (stating defendant’s argu-
ments); see also 4 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201 et seq. (West 1990) (stating
Pennsylvania’s anti-scalping laws).
175. See In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. at 492–93 (stating defendant’s
policy argument).
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seats.176  This is because “[t]he tickets themselves and the right to
renew season tickets are two separate and distinct interests” since
privileges, as opposed to property, are frequently sold in bankruptcy
matters for value.177  This is evidenced by, among other reasons,
the large number of people who bid for season tickets when they go
on sale privately, the large number of people that are on waiting
lists to become season ticket holders through the team, and the fact
that many season ticket holders purchase tickets to pre-season
games (and games during losing seasons after being eliminated
from playoff contention) solely to retain their status for the follow-
ing year.178
In coming to this conclusion, the court found ample evidence
to support the debtor’s claim that in the twenty years preceding the
suit, Sports, Inc. allowed the renewal and transfer of season ticket
rights between individuals upon the submission of a written re-
quest.179  Second, although Sports, Inc. claimed selling renewal
rights would be unfair to those on the waiting list, there was, in fact,
no evidence presented at trial that the debtor’s tickets would actu-
ally go to someone on the waiting list.180  Third, since there was no
evidence presented that the trustee was attempting to sell the sea-
son tickets for above face value, the anti-scalping provision as pro-
duced on each individual ticket did not apply (the court also
concluded the Anti-Scalping Statute did not apply to the “annual
renewal of season tickets”).181  Lastly, the court held that “the asset
at issue does not constitute a prepetition executory con-
tract . . . .”182  In summarizing its ruling in favor of the debtor, the
176. See id. at 494 (distinguishing tickets to individual events canceled due to
reasons beyond control from tickets held by season ticket holders); see, e.g., Bickett
v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (discussing tickets can-
celled due to players’ strike).
177. See In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. at 492 (applying precedent from
In re Neijberger, 934 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also 47 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 4–468(b.1) (West 1987) (declaring trustee for insolvent license
holder maintains same rights, benefits, and obligations, including right to trans-
fer); In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d at 1302 (noting value of liquor licenses in bankruptcy
cases).
178. See In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. at 495, 502 (illustrating how season
ticket holder status is valuable).
179. See id. 495–96 (dismissing defendant’s transfer policy argument and dis-
tinguishing newer policies that “contained an express nonassignability clause”).
180. See id. at 497–98 (“To prohibit Trustee from transferring his status as
season ticket holder would not be likely to provide relief to Sports, Inc. or its fans
inasmuch as the harm it seeks to prevent . . . itself through its failure to adhere
strictly to the waiting list hierarchy.”).
181. See id. at 499 (holding trustee was actually selling “record title” to tickets
as opposed to “renewal rights” as term has been coined).
182. Id. at 501 (holding § 365 was not applicable).
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court found “that the season ticket holders’ interest in season ticket
renewal may be better termed an expectancy interest rather than a
contractual interest.”183
III. ANALYSIS: COURTS SHOULD STEP IN AND PROTECT FANS BY
FINDING EXPECTANCY INTERESTS, AND THEY
NEED TO DO IT QUICKLY
In an era where the institution of PSLs is becoming more com-
monplace, not much has changed.184  As discussed in Estate of
Oshinsky,185 when the New York Giants forced long-time season
ticket holders to enter into PSL contracts for amounts ranging be-
tween $1,000 and $25,000, season ticket holders argued, “their con-
duct, as well as the conduct of Defendants over the last thirty years,
has conveyed irrevocable renewal rights to the Plaintiffs.”186  How-
ever, given that the Giants expressed in each contract that “renewal
privilege is extended at the option of the Giants, and is subject to
revocation at any time,” the District Court for the District of New
Jersey chose not to come to the defense of die-hard fans.187  Before
granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court
proclaimed, “it is [the Giants’] responsibility to oversee ticket prices
and PSL contracts, not the courts, absent a breach of an
agreement.”188
Despite the New Jersey District Court’s finding, this Article sug-
gests that in an era where professional sports teams migrate be-
tween cities and fans have large expectancy interests in their season
tickets, it should be the courts’ responsibility to protect the rights of
the average fan.189  Interestingly, in McAllister, both contracts under
dispute stated that licensees were unable to seek damages pertain-
183. Id. at 502 (emphasis added) (summarizing holding and defining “expec-
tancy interest”).  “Even if season ticket holders do not attend all games or the team
has a losing season, [season ticket holders] realize that next year’s performance
might be better and they will have the first opportunity to buy tickets which are in
very high demand.” Id.
184. See Estate of Oshinsky v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 2011 WL 383880
(D.N.J. 2011) (finding contractual interest); supra notes 106–110 (discussing Gi-
ants’ announcement that season-ticket-holder subscriptions would terminate if
holder did not enter into PSL contract in 2008).
185. 2011 WL 383880 (D.N.J. 2011).
186. See id. at *1 (stating plaintiff’s argument).
187. Id. at *7 (quoting Giants 2000 Season Ticket Invoice).  The court
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id.
188. Id. at *8 (choosing not to be judicial activist).
189. See infra notes 226–234 and accompanying text (advocating valuable ex-
pectancy interests in tickets’ renewal rights).
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ing to the PSL agreements’ terminations.190  It is unfortunate that
the Rams did not assert that as a possible defense because we do not
know what effect it might have had on the court’s opinion.191  That
being said, the prior case law examined throughout this Article
gives rise to several reasonable conclusions.192  Generally, according
to the precedent of non-bankruptcy decisions, so long as ticket re-
newal rights are not guaranteed and there is no open transfer pol-
icy, professional sports teams hold the property interest inherent in
season ticket packages.193  That could lead a reasonable person to
argue the inverse is true: in an open transfer system whereby season
ticket holders are guaranteed renewal by complying with certain
guidelines (such as purchasing tickets to each game), the owner
does own a property interest.194  Thus, under those circumstances, a
PSL holder should be able to claim damages in that interest if a
team decides to relocate cities.195
A. Reasonableness of Expectancy Interests Initially
So, what options do the courts have when NFL teams relocate
and institute PSLs?196  First, they can follow the lead of the court in
I.D. Craig and find there is an implied expectancy interest in PSLs
(and season ticket renewal rights) separate from the tickets them-
selves and force teams to award damages to fans in an incumbent
city should a team choose to relocate.197  This is especially true if a
team’s season ticket and transfer policies have been loosely en-
forced in the past.198  However, far too many courts have continued
to take a strict contractual approach.199  By doing so, not only are
190. See Milano supra note 158 and accompanying text (citing key provisions
in applicable PSL contracts and noting Rams did not assert said provisions in
defense).
191. See supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text (pointing out Rams did
not argue relevancy of ‘Additional Term’ of contract in court).
192. See infra notes 200–227 and accompanying text (discussing seminal sea-
son ticket holder legal challenges).
193. See, e.g., Reese et al., supra note 161, at 184–85 (reconciling decisions
pertaining to season ticket holder challenges).
194. Cf. id. at 185 (“[I]n re Craig established that rights to season tickets can
be considered a property interest under certain circumstances.”).
195. See, e.g., id. (explaining recognition of property interests can lead to
damages).
196. See infra notes 197–200 (generalizing two approaches courts can take).
197. See supra notes 167–183 (discussing reasoning of In re I.D. Craig Serv.
Corp.).
198. See e.g., Reese et al., supra note 161, at 181 (distinguishing challenged
season ticket holder cases on basis of which team had loose enforcement policy).
199. See infra notes 201–225 and accompanying text (discussing cases that fol-
low strict contractual approach).
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they ruining fans’ prior loyalties to their cities’ teams, but also hit-
ting the same fans where it hurts: in their wallets.200
For example, in In re Harrell,201 which took place in a similar
bankruptcy court context as I.D. Craig, the Ninth Circuit looked to
Arizona law to determine whether the option to renew season tick-
ets should be considered a property right.202  There, a debtor
owned season tickets to the Phoenix Suns (NBA) home games.203
As a Suns season ticket holder, he held an option to purchase tick-
ets to playoff games if the Suns made the post-season.204  The
debtor also renewed his season ticket package each year, which was
considered common practice.205  Just like in I.D. Craig, the debtor’s
trustee attempted to add “the opportunity to renew the debtor’s
season tickets” to the debtor’s estate.206  However, the Ninth Circuit
held “the mere expectation of renewal of an interest in property is
not a property right.”207
The Court of Appeals drew comparisons to revocable opportu-
nities inherent in deciding whether to renew lease agreements.208
In Arizona, under non-automatically renewed lease agreements, if a
lessor decides not to extend to the lessee the opportunity to renew,
the lessee is unable to be compensated for his expectation.209
Under this premise, given the fact that the Suns’ policy stated
“[w]hile the SUNS will exercise reasonable efforts to maintain re-
200. See, e.g., Reese et al., supra note 161, at 185 (“When a franchise has ex-
tremely loyal and emotionally invested fans who consider themselves to be pseudo
owners . . . . If fans are willing to fight family members in divorce or probate court
for the ‘ownership’ of tickets, is it any surprise that they will sue the owner of their
team?”).
201. 73 F.3d 218 (9th Cir. 1996).
202. See id. at 219 (citing State ex rel. Miller v. Gannett Outdoor Co. of Ariz.,
795 P.2d 221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)) (making determination based on state law).
203. See id. (providing background to bankruptcy case).
204. See id. (providing further background to case).
205. See id. (recognizing season ticket holder norm).
206. Id.  Compare id. with In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. 490, 502 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1992) (attempting to put value on option to renew season tickets).
207. In re Harrell, 73 F.3d at 219 (“The Trustee’s reliance on the bankruptcy
court’s decision in In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp . . . is misplaced.”).
208. See id. (citing State ex. rel. Miller v. Gannett Outdoor Co. of Ariz., 795
P.2d 221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)) (making comparisons to revocable opportunities
when renewing lease agreements).
209. See State ex. rel. Miller, 795 P.2d at 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (describing
what happens if lessor chooses not to extend to lessee opportunity to renew lease).
The Arizona Court of Appeals stated that “[a] mere expectation, or even
probability, that the lease will be renewed based upon past practice and present
good relations between landlord and tenant, is not a legal right of renewal.  It is
nothing more than a speculation on chance.” Id. (quoting Stroh v. Alaska State
Hous. Auth., 459 P.2d 480, 482 (Alaska 1968)).
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newal privileges, season ticket holders are not guaranteed this op-
portunity,” the debtor’s trustee was unable to sell the renewal
opportunity.210
Four years later, the Court of Claims of Ohio took the contrac-
tual approach as well when a defendant-university increased its sea-
son ticket holders’ “service fee” from under $100 per seat to $1000
per seat to finance stadium construction.211  In Rayle v. Bowling
Green State University,212 a season ticket holder filed a breach of con-
tract claim against the university for violating his ticket “lease.”213
According to the plaintiff, his leased seats were “goods,” in which
he owned a property right.214  A “Buy Back Option” was available
for those who did not wish to retain their tickets at the stated price,
but rather than accept the $2000 check that was offered to him, the
plaintiff turned to an Ohio claims court for relief to no avail.215
Expressed in its opinion to hold the plaintiff in breach of con-
tract, “the court [did] not agree with plaintiff’s characterization of
the seats as goods,” but rather viewed “the contract between the
parties [as] a personal seat license.”216  Notwithstanding the “sub-
stantial” service fee, the court viewed the expressed terms of the
contract as legally sufficient grounds to allow the price increase.217
210. In re Harrell, 73 F.3d at 219 (entering judgment in favor of Suns).
211. See generally Rayle v. Bowling Green State Univ., 739 N.E. 2d 1260 (Ohio
Ct. Cl. 2000) (holding plaintiff in breach of contract for not paying increased ser-
vice fee, thus allowing defendant to increase season ticket service fees in order to
finance stadium construction).
212. 739 N.E.2d 1260 (Ct. Cl. Ohio 2000).
213. See id. at 1261 (stating plaintiff’s characterization of his alleged property
interest).
214. See id. at 1262 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.02(A)(8) (LexisNexis
1996), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.103 (LexisNexis 2011)) (“Plaintiff
alleges that the two seats he leased from defendant constitute ‘goods’ as defined
in [OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §] 1301.02(A)(8), that he owns a property right in those
goods, and that defendant defaulted on the lease contract when it increased the
service fee in 1998.”); see also id. § 1310.65 (stating damages lessee is entitled to if
lessor defaults on lease).
215. Rayle, 739 N.E.2d at 1262 (quoting defendant’s March 25, 1998 letter to
plaintiff); see id. at 1261–62 (stating plaintiff refused defendant’s option to buy
back seats).
216. Id. at 1262.  The court further stated that “[a] ‘personal seat license’
‘constitutes personal property that is vested in the owner and that is alienable by
the terms of the grantor’s document that creates the right in the property own-
ers.’” Id. (quoting Marinik v. Cascade Group, 724 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1999)).  Finally, the court noted that “[it] is not a mere license to purchase foot-
ball tickets but rather is a valuable expectancy interest in renewable rights to sea-
son tickets that is a wholly separate and distinct interest from game tickets.” Id.
(quoting Marinik, 724 N.E.2d at 880).
217. See Rayle, 739 N.E.2d at 1262 (entering judgment in favor of defendant
by holding defendant had “high degree of official discretion”).
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In June 2017, an Indianapolis Colts fan became the most re-
cent victim of strict contractual interpretation in Frager v. Indianapo-
lis Colts.218  Back “[i]n 2010 the Colts established an online
marketplace for owners of season tickets . . . to transfer their season
ticket rights upon payment of a fee equal to 30 percent of the sale
price of the tickets.”219  As a result of said transfer policy, a plaintiff
purchased ninety-four season tickets thinking he would be able to
renew them the following season, but when he tried, the Colts re-
fused him.220  While the plaintiff argued he already owned the tick-
ets, the Colts argued the tickets were revocable.221  On top of that,
the Colts argued it had no duty to reimburse.222
In a bizarrely short opinion, the Seventh Circuit alluded to
lease agreements similarly to the court in Harell and declared, “a
season-ticket holder has no right to future season tickets unless the
Colts sold them that right in the first place, and the ticket contract
forecloses that possibility.”223  Interestingly, even though the court
chose not to offer the plaintiff relief, it recognized the easily ascer-
tainable value in his particular “reasonable expectation” of re-
newal.224  Regardless, the Seventh Circuit believed that “given the
wording of his contract with the Colts, it was merely ‘a speculation
on chance, not a legal right.’”225
In an attempt to reconcile these holdings, I.D. Craig put great
emphasis on the expectancy interest resulting from “the loose en-
forcement of the team’s transfer policies.”226  In contrast, the courts
in Oshinsky, Harrell, Rayle, and Frager did not stray from interpreting
the relevant expressed contractual language found on the team’s
218. 860 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2017); see id. at 583–84.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 584 (“[Plaintiff] has purchased season tickets for the 2015 sea-
son and he has requested their renewal for the 2016 season.”).
221. See id. (stating Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s arguments).  The Plaintiff ar-
gued that although “the Colts are free to reject any transfer, . . . the season ticket
holder continues to hold those rights if the Colts do so.”  Id. (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Plaintiff’s argument).
222. See id. (noting Colts’ argument).
223. Id.; see also supra note 206 and accompanying text (drawing comparison
to expectancy interests inherent in lease agreements).
224. Frager, 860 F.3d at 545 (“That purchasers of season tickets are willing to
pay a 30 percent transfer fee in the online marketplace indicates that the expecta-
tion of renewal added to the salable value of season tickets.”).
225. Id. (quoting Emery v. Bos. Terminal Co., 59 N.E. 763, 765 (Mass. 1901))
(holding no automatic right to transfer ownership of season tickets from one sea-
son to following season).
226. Reese et al., supra note 161, at 181.
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tickets.227  However, this Article argues that those latter courts actu-
ally erred by not drawing a distinction between “revocable licenses”
(that is, the ticket itself) and the separate expected property interest
that results from fans’ “automatic and routine ability” to both “re-
new[ ] and transfer” their season tickets.228
This distinction renders the opinions handed down by the Sev-
enth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, and the Ohio Court of Claims arguably
without merit.229  By receiving extended annual offers to ticket
holders to purchase season tickets, an “expectancy interest . . . [is]
created, fostered, and honored” by each of the respective
franchises.230  It is irrelevant whether this legal right comes from
contractual language—either printed on the back of tickets or in a
season ticket holder handbook—or made evident by the franchises’
courses of dealing.231
This is because once the Giants, Suns, and Colts granted sea-
son ticket holders the option to renew their packages, the doctrine
of “equitable estoppel” began to apply.232  Such doctrine applies
“when a party intentionally ‘induces another to believe that certain
facts exist and the other justifiably relies and acts upon such belief’
and will be prejudiced if the first is permitted to contradict the ex-
pectation it has created.”233  By intentionally issuing season tickets
to the same individuals and allowing these individuals to openly
transfer their same tickets, franchises—whether they like it or not—
227. Compare supra notes 167–183 and accompanying text (discussing In re
I.D. Craig Serv. Corp.) with supra notes 201–225 and accompanying text (discussing
cases that found a contractual interest). See generally In re Liebman, 208 B.R. 38
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (representing additional case in which court denied prop-
erty interest in right to renew season tickets).
228. In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. 490, 495 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); see
also id. at 494 (“The game tickets themselves and the right to renew the season
tickets are two separate and distinct interests of this estate.”).
229. See infra notes 230–237 and accompanying text (distinguishing what may
very well be revocable ticket from separate and distinct expectancy interest).
230. In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. at 496 (recognizing “automatic and
routine” practices create “expectancy interest in season tickets and renewals . . .
[that have] been created, fostered, and honored by [defendants] for many years”).
231. See id. at 502 n.22 (citing H.R. Woolridge Co. v. Smith, 5 Pa. D. & C. 230
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1978) (“A course of dealing has been defined as prior conduct
between parties to a particular transaction which reasonably can be construed to
establish an understanding.”).
232. See id. at 497 (citing Straup v. Times Herald, 423 A.2d 713, 720 (Pa
Super. Ct. 1980)); infra note 233 and accompanying text and related materials.
233. Id. (quoting Straup, 423 A.2d at 720).
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have produced the exact type of expectation that renders the doc-
trine applicable.234
It is precisely for this reason that the court in I.D. Craig pro-
claimed that what the “[t]rustee [was] actually selling, although
termed ‘renewal rights’ . . . [was] the ‘record title’ to the status of
registered season ticket holder which entails the entitlement to re-
ceive [an] offer to purchase season tickets each year.”235  It is also
for this reason that when teams first transition from season ticket
packages to PSL agreements, season ticket holders should not be
forced to pay tens of thousands of dollars for the right to retain
their seats; or, in the alternative, PSL prices should be offset by
damages afforded to season ticket holders due to the team’s breach
of such property interest.236  To this point, it is especially perplex-
ing that that the Seventh Circuit in Frager recognized this “reasona-
ble expectation”—as well as an accurate, non-speculative,
quantitative amount of what said expectation was worth—and still
withheld providing the plaintiff relief.237
However, as contract interpretation is a matter of state law,
there is still uncertainty as to how other jurisdictions will approach
the issue.238  This is illustrated by the Denver Broncos’ decision to
settle a class action suit filed by 575 season ticket holders when the
team changed its ticket transfer policy from an open to limited sys-
tem in 1995.239  The Broncos season ticket holders claimed dam-
ages because the team’s new policy interfered with their “abilities to
assign or sell their renewal rights.”240  Similar to the plaintiffs in I.D.
Craig, these plaintiffs highlighted how the team had previously
failed to regulate the transfer process for many years.241  In re-
234. See, e.g., Reese et al., supra note 161 (stating recommendations for sports
teams to avoid open transfer systems, wherein courts may deem ticket holders have
property interest).
235. In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. at 500.
236. See id. (advocating for logic court deduced).
237. Frager v. Indianapolis Colts, 860 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 2017) (recogniz-
ing “reasonable expectation” but following contract language to chagrin of
plaintiff).
238. See infra notes 239–243 (discussing Denver Broncos’ settlement
decision).
239. See, e.g., Reese et al., supra note 161, at 181–82 (analyzing PDB sports d/
b/a Denver Broncos decision to settle in Brinkhaus v. PDB Sports, No. 96 CV 43,
Div. 5 (D. Colo. 1996)).
240. Id. at 182 (“The plaintiffs contended the Broncos’ 1995 Transfer Policy
improperly limited season ticket holders’ abilities to assign or sell their renewal
rights (except to immediate family members), resulting in various losses.”).
241. See id. (“The plaintiffs claimed that by not regulating the ticket transfer
process for the previous 35 years, the Denver Broncos had facilitated season ticket
acquisition as an investment, rather than solely for entertainment purposes.”).
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sponse, the Broncos’ organization argued its prior policy “expressly
allowed ticket-transfer policy revisions” and that the tickets consti-
tuted revocable seat licenses.242  Although the organization’s deci-
sion to settle was likely in response to the developing trend of
recognizing an expectancy interest in the right to renew season
tickets, concededly, as some scholars point out, it is also possible
the decision was not for legal reasons at all.243
B. Increasing Difficulty in Establishing an Expectancy Interest
Moving Forward
At this point, it is important to draw a distinction between cases
in which a professional sports team instituted PSLs for the first time,
like the Giants, and cases in which the team already issued PSLs to
their fans and then chose to relocate and attempt to issue new
PSLs.244  As for the former, harmed season ticket holders will be
able to persuasively employ the reasoning of I.D. Craig in an at-
tempt to establish an expected property interest in their already-
existing season ticket holder status.245  However, McAllister stands
for the proposition that if well-drafted PSL agreements are already
executed at the time an owner decides to relocate his or her team,
the provisions found within represent legally binding terms that will
be upheld in court.246
Therefore, whether a team’s PSL agreement contains a lawful
termination clause becomes of utmost importance if ticket holders
wish to argue that there is an expected property interest in the right
to renew season tickets separate from the contractual interest of
owning the PSL itself.247  If an organization’s PSL agreement has a
valid termination clause, it will be difficult for fans to successfully
242. Id. (emphasis added) (noting Broncos’ argument).
243. See id. at 185 (“Why did the Broncos settle the case?  Perhaps the answer
is not strictly a legal one, but also includes elements of marketing, public relations
(pending stadium vote), and fan loyalty that made settling the case a smart busi-
ness decision.”).
244. Compare Estate of Oshinsky v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 2011 WL 383880
(D.N.J. 2011) (issuing PSLs to already-existing season ticket holders) with McAl-
lister v. St. Louis Rams, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1124–27 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (de-
siring issuance of new PSLs to fans in new city after decision to relocate from St.
Louis where PSLs were already executed).
245. See supra notes 226–236 and accompanying text (using routine ability to
renew tickets and loose transfer policy as means of establishing expected property
interest).
246. See McAllister, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1129 (looking to four corners of PSL
agreement to resolve dispute); see also supra notes 126–159 and accompanying text
(discussing in detail McAllister court’s determination).
247. See infra notes 248–253 and accompanying text (contrasting FANS Agree-
ment and Rams Agreement and importance of “Additional Terms” provision).
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argue that the recurring offers by the team to their stadium’s PSL
owners to purchase season tickets each year represent a property
interest distinct from the legal contractual interest resulting from a
signed PSL agreement.248  The FANS Agreement in McAllister ex-
emplifies this concept.249  Since the FANS Agreement “remain[ed]
valid only as long as NFL football [was] played at the stadium by
RAMS, up to a maximum of thirty (30) years,” the Envision and
Arnold Plaintiffs’ “expectation” that they would have an irrevocable
right to buy tickets to “transferred games” in L.A. was held to be
without merit.250
However, apparent from the Rams Agreement in McAllister, not
all PSL agreements contain a well-drafted termination clause.251
Recall that contrary to the FANS Agreement, the Rams Agreement
remained valid until the year 2025, irrelevant to the location of the
team’s home facilities.252  Therefore, when Stan Kroenke moved his
team to L.A., he breached the Rams Agreement and was required
to refund the McAllister plaintiffs’ deposits.253  Furthermore, unlike
some greedy NFL owners, “most NFL teams using a PSL system[ ]
employ permanent seat licenses to prevent a potential public rela-
tions backlash . . . .”254  When this is the case, theoretically, it should
be easier to argue there is an I.D. Craig property right in cases in-
volving PSLs than in cases involving season ticket packages.255
This is because the two main factors discussed in I.D. Craig that
compelled the court to hold that there is a property right inherent
in holding “record title” to “season ticket holder status” are ex-
pressed as legally binding characteristics of PSL agreements.256
248. See infra notes 249–253 and accompanying text (reiterating outcome for
each set of plaintiffs in McAllister).
249. See McAllister, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1126 (“[The contract has terminated
just as it would have if the contract had run its full 30 year course.  The ‘Best
Efforts’ provision is rendered ineffective (along with the rest of the Agreement) as
a result.”).
250. Id. at 1124 (quoting FANS Agreement); see id. at 1126 (“The Envision and
Arnold plaintiffs’ claims based upon the FANS Agreement are therefore without
merit, and the judgment on the pleadings will be granted to defendant Rams on
those claims.”).
251. See infra notes 252–253 (contrasting Rams Agreement).
252. See McAllister, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1127 (citing Rams Agreement) (“Unlike
the FANS Agreement the validity of the Rams Agreement is not contingent on the
Rams playing football at the Stadium.”).
253. See id. at 1128 (agreeing with McAllister Plaintiffs’ claim).
254. Reese et al., supra note 161, at 174 (emphasis added).
255. See infra notes 256–268 (applying I.D. Craig discussion about season tick-
ets to PSL).
256. In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. at 500; see supra notes 163–166 and
accompanying text (reiterating main premises of court’s holding in I.D. Craig).
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First, a signatory to a PSL agreement is guaranteed the right to
purchase their seats each year as long as they comply with the terms
of the PSL agreement.257  Second, the signatory may transfer own-
ership of the PSL per the terms of the contract.258  Accordingly, so
long as PSL agreements omit a termination clause that contractu-
ally allows teams to lawfully relocate at a moment’s notice, PSL own-
ers should be able to find success by alleging ownership of a
property interest in addition to the contractual rights provided in
the agreements themselves.259
The fact that PSL purchases began as good investment vehicles
is another factor that favors finding PSLs give rise to a property
interest.260  Around the turn of the century when PSLs started to
become commonplace, there were multiple ways fans looked to
make money from them.261  Fans bought PSLs in stadiums that
housed successful teams and re-sold tickets to individual games
above face value.262  Alternatively, PSL owners sold their entire PSL
in future years for more than the amount they originally paid for
them.263  Both strategies were successful.264  In Pittsburgh, “the av-
erage Steelers PSL became eight times more valuable in the
[eleven] years after the opening of Heinz field.”265  Likewise, as of
2012, “Ravens and Bears PSLs increased 243 percent and 131 per-
257. See, e.g.,PHILA. EAGLES STR MARKET PLACE, User Agreement (2017), avail-
able at https://eagles.strmarketplace.com/User-Agreement.aspx [https://
perma.cc/W57F-P8W9] (displaying Philadelphia Eagles’ SBL User Agreement); see
also Eagles To Charge ‘Stadium Builder License’ Fees, PHILA. BUS. J. (July 10, 2001, 5:03
PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2001/07/09/
daily18.html [https://perma.cc/73S8-PHY6] (quoting Joe Banner, then Eagles’
President: “People should understand that when they buy a license they are acquir-
ing an asset . . . . They can sell it, transfer it or give it to their children”).
258. See, e.g., id.; N.Y. GIANTS STR MARKETPLACE, GIANTS STADIUM LLC
PERSONAL SEAT LICENSE (PSL) AGREEMENT (2017), available at https://ny
giants.strmarketplace.com/Images/library/new-york-giants/psl%20agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MF7B-3KZ5] (displaying New York Giants PSL Agreement).
259. See supra notes 256–258 and accompanying text (discussing In re I.D.
Craig’s logic in context of PSLs).
260. See Ozanian, supra note 115 (concluding PSLs have been excellent invest-
ments for some teams).
261. See infra notes 261–268 and accompanying text (discussing multiple ways
PSLs began as good investments).
262. See Peter Keating, The BIZ: The PSL “Problem”, ESPN (Aug. 5, 2008),
http://www.espn.com/espnmag/story?id=3520135 [https://perma.cc/PEH5-
PPTH] (detailing “few good reasons” PSLs exist).
263. See, e.g., Ozanian, supra note 115 (discussing secondary market for PSLs).
264. See infra notes 265–266 and accompanying text (appreciating markets
where PSLs increased in value).
265. Gordon, supra note 100 (interpreting PSLs as investment vehicles).
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cent, respectively.”266  Moreover, PSLs were originally marketed to
“extremely loyal and emotionally invested fans” to allow them to
“consider themselves pseudo owners.”267  This type of marketing
strategy encouraged the expectation that PSL owners would be con-
sidered part of their city’s organization.268
Concededly, however, this expectancy interest will likely be
more difficult to establish moving forward.269  This is partly because
PSLs were more reasonably priced in the 1990s and early 2000s.270
These days, some fans may have difficulty recognizing any return
on their PSL investments due to the prices they initially paid and
their teams’ current on-going poor performances.271  Additionally,
in the future, with the rising costs of stadium construction, original
PSL purchase prices will rise to the point where it may no longer be
reasonable for a PSL purchaser to expect a return.272  With no ex-
pected return, it will make it harder to convince a court to award
damages when a team relocates.273  Those debating whether to
purchase PSLs when organizations originally offer them should also
be aware that the NFL and its members understand the effect PSLs
have on the secondary ticket market.274  If ticket prices continue to
rise each year, it could make it increasingly hard for PSL holders to
resell their season tickets for profit, which could make it harder to
266. Id. (“Even though the prices were perceived as exorbitant, fans held a
valuable asset.”).
267. Reese et al., supra note 161, at 185; see also supra notes 101–102 and ac-
companying text (discussing original PSL marketing strategy).
268. See Reese et al., supra note 161, at 185–86 (“Denver is certainly a metro-
politan area where exuberant enthusiasm for the football team appears to be the
rule, not the exception.”).
269. See infra notes 270–276 and accompanying text (detailing how market
has changed and contracts will be drafted to protect sports organizations).
270. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 100 (“But in the last few years, the PSL mar-
ket adjusted as teams began charging five to even six figures for seat licenses.”).
271. See Pat Kessler, Reality Check: Are Personal Seat Licenses a Risky Investment?,
CBS MINN. (Oct. 4, 2013, 6:43 PM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2013/10/04/
reality-check-are-personal-seat-licenses-a-risky-investment/ [https://perma.cc/
7TZG-X2XQ] (“Jets fans who tried to sell [their PSLs] lost an average of $3,233 per
seat in 2012.  Giants fans lost $189.  Cowboys fans lost an average of $2,390.”).
272. Compare id. (arguing that PSLs are risky investment some people are not
willing to make) with supra notes 261–268 and accompanying text (arguing for
expectancy interest in investment when appropriate).
273. Compare id. (arguing that PSLs are risky investment some people are not
willing to make) with supra notes 261–268 and accompanying text (arguing for
expectancy interest in investment when appropriate).
274. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 262 (discussing NFL’s recognition of secon-
dary ticket market and pros and cons to PSLs from NFLs perspective).
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establish an expected property interest.275  Moreover, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has already taken a stance “pro-
hibit[ing] teams to advertise PSLs as an investment—and to in-
clude language in the PSL contract in which the buyers
acknowledge that they have no expectation of profiting.”276
IV. CONCLUSION
Sports organizations will continue the practice of transitioning
away from issuing season ticket packages to their fans in favor of
using well-drafted PSL agreements to finance new stadiums.277
Therefore, courts have a specific window—the time organizations
first transition from season ticket packages to PSL agreements—to
employ the reasoning behind the decision handed down in I.D.
Craig: find a property interest associated with season-ticket-holder
status, and prevent teams from charging their fans for the right to
chew before tasting their food.278  The purpose of this Article is to
encourage courts to hold team owners liable for revoking season
ticket packages and award sports fans damages to help offset the
cost of rising PSL prices.279  Coupled with the plethora of routine
expenses associated with relocating cities, maybe said damages
could be severe enough to have a chilling effect on owners’ deci-
sions to relocate their teams.280
Indeed, McAllister suggests that as long as PSL agreements “are
license agreements, which are contracts governed by the general
principles of contract law,” courts will interpret them as “to ascer-
275. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 262 (mentioning one way to receive return
on investment is selling individual tickets on secondary market for above face
value).
276. See Mike Florio, PSLs May Be a Good Investment, or a Bad One, NBC SPORTS
(June 17, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/06/17/
psls-may-be-a-good-investment-or-a-bad-one/ [https://perma.cc/CA33-L255]
(pointing out Securities and Exchange Commission position on PSLs).
277. See supra notes 98–118 and accompanying text (discussing trend of own-
ers using PSLs to obtain adequate stadium financing).
278. See supra notes 228–237 and accompanying text (employing argument
from I.D. Craig to establish irrevocable property right to renew season tickets).
279. See McAllister v. St. Louis Rams, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1128–29
(E.D. Mo. 2016) (discussing matter of damages); supra note 157 and accompany-
ing text.
280. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why fan
loyalty is important consideration in decision to locate); supra notes 35–97 (dis-
cussing economics of team relocation and perspective of NFL and its teams’
owners).
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tain the intention of the parties and give effect to that intention.”281
Although this Article strongly encourages owners to appreciate the
message such a decision sends to their teams’ loyal and passionate
fan bases, it expects that future PSL agreements will demonstrate
the “meeting of the minds,” and recognize that in the event of team
relocation, the agreement between the team and PSL owners will
lawfully terminate.282
With regards to sports organizations that have instituted PSL
agreements without setting an expiration date, thank you.283  How-
ever, in the event that these organizations do relocate at some point
in future years, courts should award significant damages to these
particular PSL owners.284  The fact that PSL owners have been le-
gally granted the rights to repeatedly purchase and transfer season
tickets—alone—warrants this determination.285  Moreover, given
the way PSLs were originally marketed to loyal and passionate fans,
such an award would be doing the sports world justice.286
David Hollander*
281. McAllister, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1125 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Garst Seed
Co., 241 S.W.3d 401, 406 (Mo. Ct. App.); J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsi-
lon Club, 491 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Mo. 1973) (en banc)).
282. See Meeting of the Minds, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Ac-
tual assent by both parties to the formation of a contract, meaning that they agree
on the same terms, conditions, and subject matter.”); see McAllister, 209 F. Supp. 3d
at 1125 (quoting J.E. Hathman, S.W.3d at 264 (“A court will not resort to construc-
tion where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous lan-
guage for there is nothing to construe.”)).
283. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (appreciating perpetuity of
term).
284. See supra notes 255–268 and accompanying text (arguing strongly for ex-
pected property interest in PSLs).
285. See supra notes 160–183 and accompanying text (discussing I.D. Craig).
286. See Gordon, supra note 100 (claiming PSLs were way to incorporate loyal
fans into stadium construction process).
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